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Practicing Reference . . .

Other Uses of Legislative History*
Mary Whisner**
Although we usually think of using legislative history to determine legislative intent
when interpreting statutes, Ms. Whisner shows that legislative documents can be useful for other, less controversial purposes as well.
I am rumored to believe that the only legitimate use of legislative history is to prop
open heavy doors or to put under the seats of little children not quite tall enough
to reach the table.

— Hon. Alex Kozinski1
¶1 Debate swirls around the use of legislative history for interpreting statutes.2

Recognizing this, many of our presentations on how to research legislative history
begin with a caveat that some judges and scholars think it shouldn’t be used at all.3
After the caveat, we go on to describe the documents that legislatures produce and
how to find them—but the whole enterprise is clouded by the uncertainty about
their use. Meanwhile, no one seems to talk about the other uses of legislative history (and, more broadly, legislative documents).
¶2 This column is not an attempt to wade into the fracas over using legislative
history to divine the meaning of statutes.4 My goal here is to illustrate a variety of
other uses for legislative history. The examples are drawn from real legal work and
* © Mary Whisner, 2013. I am grateful to Mary A. Hotchkiss and Nancy C. Unger for their
assistance with this piece.
** Reference Librarian, Marian Gould Gallagher Law Library, University of Washington School
of Law, Seattle, Washington.
1. Interbranch Relations: Hearings Before the Joint Comm. on the Organization of Congress, 103d
Cong. 83 (1993) (statement of Judge Alex Kozinski). While cautioning against courts “allow[ing]
legislative history to do too much of the work of interpretation,” Kozinski states that it “can be an
immensely valuable tool for resolving certain types of problems in statutory interpretation.” Id.
2. See Steven M. Barkan et al., Fundamentals of Legal Research 157, 158 n.3 (9th ed. 2009)
(citing sources).
3. See, e.g., Georgetown Law Library, Legislative History Research: A Tutorial, at slide 6, http://
www.law.georgetown.edu/library/research/tutorials/lh/upload/leghist-slide01.pdf (Jan. 2, 2013)
(“Can be controversial!”). See also Barkan et al., supra note 2, at 158–59 (“This conflict has led to a
re-examination of legislative histories as a subject in law school legal research courses.”).
4. I can’t resist sharing something I learned during my research: a number of state legislatures
have enacted statutes instructing courts to use legislative history as an interpretive aid. The statutes
are listed in the appendix, infra, for readers who, like me, might have heard talk about the use of
federal legislative history in the federal courts without considering whether there might be different
rules in the states.
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scholarship. Together they provide many reasons to learn to find legislative history
materials.
Legislative Advocacy
¶3 The students in my law school’s legislative advocacy clinic try to persuade

the state legislature to enact or amend laws to address perceived problems. In
recent years, students have worked on measures concerning juvenile records, juvenile runaways, and compensation for people released from prison after wrongful
convictions. When the clinic’s instructors asked me to speak to the students about
legislative history research, I realized they needed to think about how to mine legislative history for different nuggets than the appellate lawyer who wants to argue
for a particular interpretation of ambiguous statutory language. If the students
hope to advocate amending an existing statute, they might ask
•
•
•
•

Which legislators pushed for it?
What did they say they wanted to accomplish? Can we go back and argue
that the law didn’t do what they hoped?
Which citizens groups and government agencies testified for and against
it? What were their concerns? Can we find potential allies for our efforts
today? Are there potential opponents we should be aware of?
Has the legislature’s makeup changed in a way that will help us or hurt us?

Whatever measures the students are promoting, they should look at measures on
related topics in the last few legislative sessions:
•
•
•

Which legislators have proposed bills? Who is interested in our issues?
Which committees considered the bills? Were hearings held? Who testified?
How far did the bills go?

Gathering all this information can help students plan their own efforts in more
ways than one. When they view committee hearings, not only can they look at the
substance of what legislators and witnesses say, but they can also see what the committee room is like and anticipate the experience they will have when they travel to
Olympia to testify. Now that the clinic is a few years old, the students can even
watch webcasts of former students testifying.5
¶4 Clearly, these students can learn a lot from legislative history research. In
fact, the process is generally more fruitful for them than for the researcher who is
trying to find a key sentence to unlock the mystery of an ambiguous phrase in a
statute (preferably to the advantage of the researcher’s client). We all know that
those keys are rare and hard to find.

5. See, e.g., Senate Human Services and Corrections Comm. Hearing, TVW (Mar. 17, 2011),
http://www.tvw.org/index.php?option=com_tvwplayer&eventID=2011030125 (testimony of clinic
student Ramona Whittington in support of Substitute House bill 1793, restricting access to juvenile
records) (video at 53:00).

Vol. 105:2 [2013-11]

OTHER USES OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

¶5 Of course, clinic students are not the only ones for whom this research

would be helpful. Practicing lawyers, lobbyists, public interest groups, and citizens
can also benefit from being able to find information about the workings of the
legislature.
Current Awareness
¶6 To advise their clients well, lawyers often need to anticipate changes in the
law, so it is useful to be aware of measures that are introduced and how they are
faring. It is not unusual to see coverage of pending legislation in legal newsletters.
For instance, Interpreter Releases, a newsletter for immigration lawyers, has a regular
feature titled “Newly Introduced Legislation.”6 A recent government contracting
newsletter notes: “Bills Would Expand Contractor Whistleblower Protections.”7
Another newsletter reports on a Senate bill, the Prepaid Card Consumer Protection
Act, that would add some consumer protections and require the Consumer Finance
Protection Board and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to issue appropriate regulations.8
¶7 Litigators also need to keep up with new legislation. When the Protection of
Lawful Commerce in Arms Act was enacted,9 the gun manufacturers who had been
sued by the City of New York moved to dismiss the case or alternatively to stay the
proceedings and vacate the approaching trial date. The city argued that the act did
not apply and, if it did, it was unconstitutional. But Judge Jack Weinstein didn’t
want to move the trial date, and he thought the recent passage of the law was hardly
a reason for delay:
The bill embodied in the Act has been pending for a long time. . . . It can reasonably be
assumed that the parties have already given a great deal of thought—supported by legal and
other research—to its application and validity. They should be capable of promptly briefing
both the constitutional and other statutory issues now raised.10

6. Interpreter Releases is published forty-eight times per year and is available on Westlaw.
7. Bills Would Expand Contractor Whistleblower Protections, Gov’t Contractor, Sept. 26, 2012,
at ¶ 296.
8. Monica C. Platt, An Uncertain Regulatory Future for Prepaid Cards, Banking & Fin. Servs.
Pol’y Rep., July 2012, at 5–6. The article uses 2012 Senate hearings for information about prepaid
cards.
9. Pub. L. No. 109-92, 119 Stat. 2095 (2005).
10. City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 2005 WL 2979104, *1 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2005) (citing
the Congressional Record and news stories). On interlocutory appeal, the Second Circuit held that the
statute did apply. City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 524 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2008). So, as it turned
out, the trial did not begin on schedule after all. But the point remains: the judge believed that the
lawyers must have been following legislation that could have such a big impact on their business and
the case. Indeed, the general counsel of the named defendant, Beretta U.S.A. Corp., had testified at a
hearing on a bill with the same name in an earlier Congress. Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms
Act: Hearing on H.R. 2037 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the
H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. 79 (2002) (statement of Jeff Reh).
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Facts
¶8 A recent student-written law review article about sex trafficking opens with
the story of Sonia, a teenager from El Salvador who was forced to work in a brothel
in the United States and then faced the Department of Homeland Security, the
Department of Health and Human Services, and the Department of Justice.11
Using a story is one way to capture the reader’s attention and set the scene for an
article,12 and this story does its job well. Where did the student author find Sonia’s
story? It was in a witness’s statement in a congressional hearing.13 Later in the
article, the author uses legislative history materials to support the propositions that
the sex trade is a quick way to make money,14 that sex trafficking is a “human
calamity,”15 that the Trafficking Victims Protection Act was “part of an ambitious
endeavor to combat human trafficking,”16 and that the act “took a decidedly victim-centered approach.”17 The author does not use legislative history to argue for
an interpretation of the law. Instead he uses the materials to provide context for his
discussion of the law and his eventual recommendation that Congress amend it.
¶9 Many authors use legislative materials as sources for facts and stories. For
instance, two academics used committee reports alongside journalistic accounts to
summarize insider-trading scandals.18 A judge cited two committee reports to support his assertion that “[t]he declining fortunes of the nation’s rail industry came
to a crucial focus in the 1970’s, when the collapse of several major carriers necessitated a substantial federal effort to ensure the continuation of vital service and to
restore the rail industry to a level of financial health.”19 A student drew facts about
the danger of algae blooms from committee reports.20 Another student used legislative materials as sources for statistics about the number of people with disabilities, their high rate of unemployment, and their low incomes.21 A judge reviewing
11. Theodore R. Sangalis, Comment, Elusive Empowerment: Compensating the Sex Trafficked
Person Under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, 80 Fordham L. Rev. 403, 404–05 (2011).
12. See, e.g., Chip Heath & Dan Heath, Made to Stick 206 (2007) (discussing the power of
stories); Helen Sword, Stylish Academic Writing 85–86 (2012). By the way, I highly recommend
both of these books.
13. Sangalis, supra note 11, at 404 n.1 (citing Legal Options to Stop Human Trafficking: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Human Rights and the Law of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 74
(2007) (statement of Katherine Kaufka, Nat’l Immigrant Justice Ctr.)).
14. Id. at 412 n.77 (citing International Trafficking in Persons: Taking Action to Eliminate Modern
Day Slavery: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 110th Cong. 19 (2007) (statement of
Sharon Cohn, Senior Vice President, Int’l Justice Mission)).
15. Id. at 413 n.96 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 110-430, pt. 1, at 34 (2007)).
16. Id. at 417 n.141 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 106-487, pt. 2, at 2 (2000)).
17. Id. at 418 n.144 (citing Implementation of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on Int’l Relations, 107th Cong. 3 (2001) (statement of Hon. Henry J. Hyde,
Chairman, H. Comm. on Int’l Relations)).
18. Thomas L. Hazen & Jerry W. Markham, Broker-Dealer Operations Under the Securities
and Commodities Law § 2:28 (Westlaw Nov. 2012).
19. Simmons v. I.C.C., 697 F.2d 326, 328 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
20. Marcel De Armas, Changing Tides: The Need for New Legislation to Prevent Algae Blooms, 7
Sustainable Dev. L. & Pol’y 44, 44 nn.1–2, 4, 7–8, 10 (2006).
21. Reese John Henderson Jr., Special Project, Addiction as Disability: The Protection of Alcoholics
and Drug Addicts Under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 44 Vand. L. Rev. 713, 714 n.3
(1991) (citing the Congressional Record and a committee report).
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an asylum denial cited NGO human rights reports that had been published in the
Congressional Record.22 Another judge used statistics from the Congressional Record
to support a claim of tepid enforcement by the Department of Justice under the
Child Support Recovery Act.23
¶10 Two more examples come from state search and seizure cases. In a Vermont
case, the issue was whether officers had reasonable suspicion to pull over a car after
seeing a thin red beam, which the officers thought might be a laser-sighting device
for a gun but was in fact a laser pointer. The majority found that the officers’ inference that it was a sighting device—and that a sighting device was of concern—was
reasonable, citing introduced bills, statements in the Congressional Record, and a
committee report to support the claim that laser sights are becoming prevalent and
are used in committing crimes.24 In a Florida case, the issue was whether officers
had reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk a young man at a bus stop, based on an
anonymous tip that he had a gun. The majority held that the officers did not, and
hence suppressed the evidence they found.25 A dissenter believed that the anonymous tip was sufficient, bolstering his position with a description of the prevalence
of gun violence and citations from the Congressional Record about violent crimes
committed by juveniles.26
¶11 Why use legislative materials as a source for facts? First, they’re widely available. It’s easier for a law student to find a committee report that summarizes the
hazards of algae blooms than to sort through marine biology journals. If a judge
wants support for his assertion that juvenile crime is on the rise, the Congressional
Record is handier than formal criminology journals and texts.27
¶12 Second, the materials probably seem like good, credible sources. But are
they? Maybe, maybe not. On the one hand, many people preparing to testify before
a congressional committee take great care to get their facts straight and to present
careful, well-reasoned arguments. Reliability might be increased by the setting,
since their assertions could be probed by committee members, other witnesses, or
the press. On the other hand, a wide variety of people, representing many interests
and views, testify. Even without intending to deceive, they could present “facts” that
are less than rock solid. Likewise, the assertions senators and representatives make
in the Congressional Record, many of them motivated by politics, might not be
entirely reliable. Despite these cautions, legislative materials are a useful, practical
source for many facts.28
22. Marcu v. I.N.S., 147 F.3d 1078, 1082 (9th Cir. 1998). The dissenting judge also cited reports
and statements in the Congressional Record. Id. at 1087.
23. United States v. Mussari, 168 F.3d 1141, 1145 (9th Cir. 1999) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc).
24. State v. Kindle, 751 A.2d 757, 758–59 (Vt. 2000). The court also cited legislation from two
other states.
25. J.L. v. State, 727 So. 2d 204, 209 (Fla. 1999).
26. Id. at 211 n.8 (Overton, J., dissenting).
27. This point is weaker now than it was twenty or thirty years ago. I suspect that most law students are more comfortable searching Google Scholar, newspaper archives, or periodical indexes from
other disciplines than they are working with legislative history materials. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer &
Virginia J. Wise, Nonlegal Information and the Delegalization of Law, 39 J. Legal Stud. 495, 513 (2000)
(“[I]n previously barely imagined ways the universe of nonlegal information is now easily and cheaply
available to lawyers, judges, and other legal decision makers.”).
28. For a discussion of judges’ use of outside research, see Elizabeth F. Judge, Curious Judge:
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Overview and Perspective
¶13 It is often hard to make sense of a statute by jumping into it section by section. It helps to get an overview and some sense of what motivated the legislature.
Here, legislative history can be very useful. (Note that I’m not saying that the
reports and so on would trump the clear words of the statute—just that they can
provide a context.)
¶14 If you wanted to learn about the Child Protection Act of 2012, you could
go directly to the statute. After Section 1 (Short Title), you would find:
SEC. 2. ENHANCED PENALTIES FOR POSSESSION OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY.
(a) CERTAIN ACTIVITIES RELATING TO MATERIAL INVOLVING THE SEXUAL
EXPLOITATION OF MINORS.—Section 2252(b)(2) of title 18, United States Code, is
amended by inserting after “but if ” the following: “any visual depiction involved in the
offense involved a prepubescent minor or a minor who had not attained 12 years of age,
such person shall be fined under this title and imprisoned for not more than 20 years, or if.”
(b) CERTAIN ACTIVITIES RELATING TO MATERIAL CONSTITUTING OR
CONTAINING CHILD PORNOGRAPHY.—Section 2252A(b)(2) of title 18, United States
Code, is amended by inserting after “but, if ” the following: “any image of child pornography involved in the offense involved a prepubescent minor or a minor who had not attained
12 years of age, such person shall be fined under this title and imprisoned for not more
than 20 years, or if.”29

Unless you are already steeped in the statutory framework, you would have some
trouble figuring out what the old law was, how the new law changes it, and how it
fits into the bigger picture. Is the twenty-year penalty new? Or is it changing a
penalty that was in the statute being amended?
¶15 The Congressional Research Service summary (available on THOMAS)
says of this portion of the law: “Amends the federal criminal code to impose a fine
and/or prison term of up to 20 years for transporting, receiving, distributing, selling, or possessing pornographic images of a child under the age of 12.”30 It’s
quicker and easier to understand than section 2 of the statute itself. The sectionby-section analysis in the bill’s committee report summarizes: “This section
increases the maximum penalty from 10 to 20 years for offenses under sections
2252(b)(2) and 2252A(b)(2) of Title 18 involving prepubescent minors or minors
under the age of 12.”31 That gives us important information (the penalty is doubling) in a concise statement.
¶16 Reports are also valuable for the context of the legislation. In this situation
you aren’t looking for something short (the report on the Child Protection Act is
more than six times as long as the act32), but rather for something that explains the
Judicial Notice of Facts, Independent Judicial Research, and the Impact of the Internet, 2012 Ann. Rev.
Civ. Litig. 325. In the cases I’ve mentioned, judges are generally using the Congressional Record and
other materials for “legislative and social framework facts” rather than “adjudicative facts.” See id. at
331.
29. Child Protection Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-206, § 2, 126 Stat. 1490, 1490.
30. Bill Summary & Status, 112th Congress (2011–2012), H.R.6063, CRS Summary, THOMAS,
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d112:HR06063:@@@D&summ2=m& (last visited Feb. 6,
2012).
31. H.R. Rep. No. 112-638, at 17 (2012).
32. The report is thirty-two pages, while the session law is barely five pages long.
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prior state of the law, the problem the law is supposed to address, and how the law’s
sponsors think it will help. The report includes a discussion headed “Background
and Need for the Legislation.”33 You’ll also find “Dissenting Views,” which contains
a discussion of the bill, its background, and the reasons three of the committee
members opposed it.34 If you are interested in the due process concerns raised, you
can use this section as a starting point for further research, since the dissenters cite
and discuss two Supreme Court cases.35
¶17 The authors of treatises and practice guides recognize the value of context
and often include a discussion of legislative history when they outline a statutory
scheme. For example, the Bankruptcy Desk Guide uses committee reports to compare the Bankruptcy Code with the Securities Investor Protection Act.36 Securities
Litigation: Damages uses legislative history to give context for the provisions concerning lead plaintiffs and lead counsel in the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995.37 The Department of Justice Manual uses legislative history for the
background of the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act.38 Hazen and
Markham cite hearings from the 1920s through the 1980s to demonstrate the long
history of broker-dealer regulation.39 The Health Law Handbook cites hearings in
explaining the statutory framework for the Stark Act’s specialty hospital loophole.40
And Food and Drug Administration uses a variety of materials to discuss the history
of premarket approval of medical devices.41
Critique and Analysis
¶18 Sifting through legislative history is also useful for commentators who want
to step back to analyze the work of the legislative body. For example, a student
author carefully traced the history of legislation protecting the domestic catfish
industry.42 A central provision defines “catfish” in such a way that Asian fish resembling the North American catfish cannot be labeled “catfish.” The author does not
argue that the statute should be interpreted otherwise. Her point, rather, is that the
definition was written as it was because of the influence of the catfish industry.43
¶19 A researcher can look at a very specific provision—like the definition of
“catfish”—or at a broad class of legislation. When William Eskridge wanted to
33. H.R. Rep. No. 112-638, at 4–11.
34. Id. at 24–32.
35. Id. at 27 (citing Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979), and Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S.
307 (1985)).
36. 3 Bankruptcy Desk Guide § 34:147 (Westlaw Aug. 2012).
37. Michael J. Kaufman, Securities Litigation: Damages § 3:14 (Westlaw Sept. 2012).
38. 4 Department of Justice Manual, at tit. 8, no. 6 (Westlaw 2013).
39. Hazen & Markham, supra note 18, at § 8:15.
40. 2006 Health Law Handbook § 13:4 nn.4, 7, 9–12, 14 (Alice G. Gosfield ed., Westlaw June
2012).
41. 1 James T. O’Reilly, Food and Drug Administration § 18:61 (3d ed., Westlaw Dec. 2012).
42. Kerrilee E. Kobbeman, Legislative Note, Hook, Line and Sinker: How Congress Swallowed the
Domestic Catfish Industry’s Narrow Definition of this Ubiquitous Bottomfeeder, 57 Ark. L. Rev. 407
(2004).
43. Id. at 417.
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determine how often Congress overrides the Supreme Court’s interpretation of a
statute—and what sorts of decisions are most often affected—he and his research
assistants reviewed all the reports published in United States Code Congressional
and Administrative News to spot occasions when the committee indicated that a
statute “overruled,” “modified,” or “clarified” a federal judicial interpretation of a
statute.44 Like the catfish piece, this article did not use the legislative history to
interpret the statutes, but rather to explore how the legislation came about.45
¶20 Eskridge’s work looking at the institutional roles of Congress and the
courts could be seen as a work of political science as well as legal scholarship.
Another field that draws from the rich body of legislative material is history,
including legal history.46 Biographers of federal judges, political scientists, and legal
scholars can all find useful material in judicial confirmation hearings and debates.47
¶21 Legislative history materials can also be used as raw material for rhetorical
analysis. For instance, John Nagle looked at “endangered species” as a trope,48 citing
instances from the Congressional Record of politicians using the term to include
“the fine people of San Antonio,”49 the public lands states,50 the middle-class
taxpayer,51 small gas stations,52 “our maritime industries,”53 the American-made
typewriter,54 and—hold onto your hats—the legal profession.55 Another author
examined the emotionally charged language used in discussing sex offender laws.56
Someone else analyzed the rhetoric in the debates on the Detainee Treatment Act
of 2005, placing the debates “within broader American cultural narratives about
the law and lawyers’ roles in society.”57
44. William N. Eskridge Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101
Yale L.J. 331, 336 (1991). They weeded out some references and also searched other reports, selected
hearings, and secondary sources. Id. at 336–37.
45. Eskridge found, among other things, that “decisions that were overridden were more likely
to have relied on a statute’s plain meaning or the canons of construction than either decisions not
scrutinized or decision[s] scrutinized but not overridden.” Id. at 351.
46. See, e.g., Edward J. Larson, “In the Finest, Most Womanly Way”: Women in the Southern
Eugenics Movement, 39 Am. J. Legal Hist. 119, 130–37, 141–47 (1995) (discussing legislation in
Louisiana in the 1920s and in Georgia in the 1930s and citing state legislative journals).
One reviewer of the eleventh edition of the Bluebook said, “Use e.g. when there are other
examples you are too lazy to find or are skeptical of unearthing.” Peter Lushing, Book Review, 67
Colum. L. Rev. 599, 601 (1967). I am not at all skeptical of being able to unearth many more examples
of historians using legislative history material.
47. In a sense, these aren’t “legislative history” because they don’t relate to legislation. But they
are documents produced by the legislature, and they are researched using many of the same tools used
for legislative history documents.
48. John Copeland Nagle, Endagered [sic] Species Wannabees, 29 Seton Hall L. Rev. 235 (1998).
49. Id. at 237 n.18.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 237 n.19.
52. Id. at 238 n.21.
53. Id. at 239 n.25.
54. Id. at 239 n.24.
55. Id. at 240 n.27.
56. Mona Lynch, Pedophiles and Cyber-Predators as Contaminating Forces: The Language of
Disgust, Pollution, and Boundary Invasions in Federal Debates on Sex Offender Legislation, 27 Law &
Soc. Inquiry 529 (2002).
57. Ariel Meyerstein, The Law and Lawyers as Enemy Combatants, 18 U. Fla. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y
299, 300 (2007).
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Conclusion
¶22 None of the examples discussed here is startling. As I’ve gone through each
set of examples—legislative advocacy, current awareness, facts, overview and perspective, critique and analysis—I’m sure that readers have nodded their heads,
thinking that each use was familiar.
¶23 If we are aware of all these uses, why do we focus only on using legislative
history to interpret statutory provisions?58 Perhaps because first-year law students
spend so much time reading appellate cases and often compete in an appellate
moot court, we emphasize research that is important in appellate work. And
because all eyes are on the U.S. Supreme Court, we pay attention to research tools
that are important in appellate work. That’s important and students should learn
about using legislative history in statutory interpretation (or not, depending on
jurisdiction and interpretive approach). But let’s remember the many other uses for
legislative history.

58. Maybe I’m wrong about this. I haven’t sat in on the hundreds of presentations about legislative history that are offered across the country each year. Maybe lots of people go beyond statutory
interpretation.

251

252

LAW LIBRARY JOURNAL

Vol. 105:2 [2013-11]

Appendix
State Statutes on Using Legislative History in Statutory Interpretation
1. Explicit Direction to Use Legislative History
Colorado
If a statute is ambiguous, the court, in determining the intention of the
general assembly, may consider . . .
(c) The legislative history, if any;
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 2-4-203 (West, Westlaw through ch. 2 of 2013 1st reg. sess.).
Iowa
If a statute is ambiguous, the court, in determining the intention of the
legislature, may consider . . .
(3) The legislative history.
Iowa Code Ann. § 4.6 (West, Westlaw 2012 reg. sess.).
Louisiana
A. When the meaning of a law cannot be ascertained by [code provisions
concerning plain language and interpretive rules], the court shall consider
the intent of the legislature.
B. (1) The text of a law is the best evidence of legislative intent.
(2)(a) The occasion and necessity for the law, the circumstances under
which it was enacted, concepts of reasonableness, and contemporaneous legislative history may also be considered in determining legislative
intent.
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 24:177 (West, Westlaw through 2012 reg. sess.).
Minnesota
When the words of a law are not explicit, the intention of the legislature
may be ascertained by considering . . .
(7) the contemporaneous legislative history;
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 645.16 (West, Westlaw through 2012 1st spec. sess.).
New Mexico
C. [T]he following aids to construction may be considered in ascertaining
the meaning of the text: . . .
(2) the purpose of a statute or rule as determined from the legislative or
administrative history of the statute or rule;
N. Mex. Stat. Ann. § 12-2A-20 (West, Westlaw through 2012 2d reg. sess.).
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New York
The courts may in a proper case indulge in a departure from literal construction and will sustain the legislative intention although it is contrary to
the literal letter of the statute.
Where there is doubt as to the meaning of the language of a statute, various
extrinsic matters throwing light on the legislative intent may be considered
by the courts.
In ascertaining the purpose and applicability of a statute, it is proper to
consider the legislative history of the act, the circumstances surrounding
the statute’s passage, and the history of the time
If the interpretation to be attached to a statute is doubtful, the courts may
utilize legislative proceedings to determine legislative intent.
N.Y. Stat. §§ 111, 120, 124, 125 (McKinney, Westlaw through ch. 2, 2013).
North Dakota
If a statute is ambiguous, the court, in determining the intention of the
legislation, may consider . . .
3. The legislative history.
N. Dak. Cent. Code Ann. § 1-02-39 (West, Westlaw through 2011 reg. & spec. sess.).
Ohio
If a statute is ambiguous, the court, in determining the intention of the
legislature, may consider . . .
(C) The legislative history;
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1.49 (West, Westlaw through file 201 of the 2012 gen.
assembly with exceptions).
Oregon
(1)(a) In the construction of a statute, a court shall pursue the intention of
the legislature if possible.
(b) To assist a court in its construction of a statute, a party may offer the
legislative history of the statute. . . .
(3) A court may limit its consideration of legislative history to the information that the parties provide to the court. A court shall give the weight to
the legislative history that the court considers to be appropriate.
Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 174.020 (West, Westlaw through 2012 reg. sess.).
Pennsylvania
(c) When the words of a statute are not explicit, the intention of the
General Assembly may be ascertained by considering . . .
(7) The contemporaneous legislative history.
1 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1921 (West, Westlaw through 2012 reg. sess.).
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Texas
In construing a statute, whether or not the statute is considered ambiguous
on its face, a court may consider . . .
(3) legislative history;
Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.023 (West, Westlaw through 2011 reg. sess. & 1st
called sess. of 82d legis.).
2. Arguable Acceptance of Use of Legislative History
Georgia
(a) In all interpretations of statutes, the courts shall look diligently for the
intention of the General Assembly, keeping in view at all times the old law,
the evil, and the remedy.
Ga. Code Ann. § 1-3-1 (West, Westlaw through 2012 reg. sess.).
Hawaii
Where the words of a law are ambiguous:
....
(2) The reason and spirit of the law, and the cause which induced the
legislature to enact it, may be considered to discover its true meaning.
Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 1-15 (West, Westlaw through 2012 reg. and spec. sess.).
Massachusetts
(b) A court may take judicial notice of . . . legislative history . . . .
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. § 202 (West, Westlaw through ch. 464 of 2012 2d ann.
sess.).

